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C H A P T li R I.
IMATURii: OF PUBLIC OFFIGii.
According to the Constitution of Illinois^ -'^ "An office
is a public position created by txie constitution or law, continuing
i
i| during the pleasure of the appointing power, or for a fixed time,
ij
1,
with a successor elected or appointed. An employinent is an
agency, for a temporary purpose, which ceases when that purpose is
accomplished,"
I
The nature of public office has also received judicial
interpretation, but it rnay be said that the elements which enter
into sucii are not clearly defined. Minor offices shade imper-
ceptibly into employments so that the distinction between' them
cannot be pointed out. Whether or not one may be regarded as an
officer or an employee of the state depends largely upon the nature
of the action in whicli the question is raised. The distinction
usually drawn is that an employment is based on contract while an
office is based on some provision of law, the latter being regarded
as the delegation of some of the sovereign power.
In Bunn v. The People, (^)it was held that the commission-
ers appointed under the act of the legislature in providing for the
erection of a new state house were not officers but were mere agents
or employees of the government, appointed for a single and special
purpose. Whose functions wore at an end upon the completion of tae
work. In attempting to show the distinction the court, in a-
~™!'.'!/^"^''''^^ ' decision in the Supreme Court of Maine, ^^l
(i)Art. V, sec. 24. (2 ) 45 71773977 ^"'(3)" TorZ^lr 48i'.'

jsaid: "The term, 'ofricG', implies a delegation of the sovereign
power to, and a possef.f.ion of it by, the person filling the offico,
ond tiie exercise of such pcv.er v;ithin u.i;niti. constitutes tiie
I
correct discharge of the duties of an office. The power thus
delegated and possessed may be a portion belonging sometimes to
,
one- of tiie tliree great departm.ents a^-c' sometimes to another. The
i:
constitutional meaning of tlie term implies an authority to exercise '
;
some portion of the sovereign power, eitlier in making, executing or
|j
'I
adninistoring t'-"' lav/E'.'
jj
The distinction thus drawn is impo rtan t .when it is con-
[
siderec that an off ice, not being based on contract, is not affected
by the clause in the Federal and Ctate Constitutions v/hich forbid
|:
the legislature from passing any lav; impairing the obligation of
1
:
contract; thus allowing the legislature to terminate, at pleasure,
any office created by statute. !;
As further showine^ the nature of public office, it has
I
been held that an office is not a franchise nor is it property.
' In People v. Hoitz^,'^) a case involving the title to office, the
court, after citing numerous au tho iritie s , held that an office was
not a franchise within the meaning of the :;onst itution or statute,
ii
prescribing tne appellate jurisciction of the Supreme and Appellate
Courts. The court, in ho^ui!,^ l.i..t an office was not property,
in the case of Donahue v. the County of V.ill^^), argued that, as
an office was created for the express ^ujrpose of aclministering
public affairs, anci tnixt tuQ incumbent taereof was not exercising
the powers conferred upon him for his own benefit but for the wel-
:j
fare of the public, it would be impossible to conceive of an office
as property.
I
(Ar~9^~'iii7'426T ("s )" I'do 'fTITTr.' ~*
f
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The case of Conner v. Ivlayor of New York^^^was cited, v/here it was
said that "public offices are incorporeai hereditanients
, nor have
they the character- or quality of grants. Tliey are agencies
created for the benefit of tiie public and not for the benefit of
the incumbent." Tiiis construction upon tlie nature public
office makes it iir.possible for an officer, after having been re-
moved, to set up any claim that he had been deprived of property
v; i thou t du g r-o cess of i a w
,
(6) i Selden 285.

: H A r T ]^ R IT.
COJ^CTITUTIOKAL OFFIO^G.
The Constitution recognizes two classes of o.rfices;
those creatsC. by the Constitution itself, and those created by
statute. The exercise cf tiie .-ore important governmental
functions is usually provided for by the constitution, while to the
legislature is allowed the right to create additional offices as
the needs of the state demand. Though not differ ing greatly
in tlie nature of tneir functions, there is a difference in the ex-
tent of the control which may be exercised over them by the depart-
ments of government. In the case of The People v . " 2ollam^ -^^
,
it was held that an orcinance of a city which provided for the ap-
pointment of constables by the president of the village board was
repugnant to that clause of tlie Constitution v/hich provides that
constables shall be elected in and for such tistricts as are cr
may be provided by law. As to the exemption from control of
t'le legislative di;partr!ien t granted to constitutional offices, the
court said: "V/here the means for the exercise of a granted power
are given, no other or different means can be applied as being
more effectual or convenient". ' The power which the legis-
lature possesses over offices of this class is limited, and then
only to the extent that no constitutional provision is violated.
The power which courts exercise over such offices will appear from
subsequent chapters.
The offices created by the Constitution „:ay be classified
according as they are executive, legislative or judicial.
(1) 132 111. 528.
J
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3xeciitive department.
Jomprises the offices of governor, lieutenant-governor,
secretary of state, auditor of public accounts, treasurer, super-
intendent of public instruction, and. attome\^
-general
. ""he
term of office cf each being four years with the exception of the
treasurer v.-ho holds for two years.
Legislative department.
Consists of a senate and a house of representatives.
One senator elected in and for each of the fifty-one senatorial
district:, for a term of four years, and three representatives e-
lected in and for each of the same districts for a term of two
years . (3)
Judicial department.
Some of the courts of the judicial department and the
offices associated tiierev.i th were directly created by the Consti-
tution, v.hile some ;vliich now exist were not established, but pre-
vision was made w.iereby the legislature might create certain tri-
bunals when it saw fit. Thus, when brought into existence,
they assumed the status of constitutional offices.
'"he Supreme Court consists of seven judges elected for
a ter,^, nine years from the judicial district in which each re-
sioes. Provision is made for altering, increasing or diminish-
in^ such districts. (4)
Jircuit courts are created, over which one judge, elected
in and for each circuit for a term of six years, presides. ^acl:
is not to include more than one hundred thousand population
( ^) Art
, y\^^'o:i7^'l^^^^
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The legislature is given power to create separate circuits when
the business in any circuit occupies nine months of the year.
The Ctate may also be divided into judicial circuits of greater
population, in lieu of the above circuits, over which judges, e-
lected by general ticket may preside, the number of judges being
limited to four.^""^^
County courts are cre-ited; also the officeh of county
judge and county clerk; terms of office four years. The leg-
islature is given power to create districts of two or more con-
tiguous counties, over whicli one judge may preside (6)
Provision was made for the creation of appellate courts
in the districts formed for that purpose, their jurisdiction to be
determined by law. When created, the Constitution provided
tliat they should be held by the judgos of the circuit courts.
All other matters pertaining thereto were left to the discretion
of the legislature .( 7)
The legislature is also given power to create probate
.^ourts in counties of over fifty thousand population, one judge
to be elected for a term of four years. (G)
Provision is also made for the election cf justices
of the peace, police magistrates, and constables in and for such
districts as may be provided for by lav. .O) The office of
|
state's attorney is createu, term thereof, four years .( 10)
'
Cook County constitutes one judicial circuit. Circuit,
court presided over by five judges until increased as otherwise
provided. Superior Court of Cook County continued; number of
;judges fixed by law; term six years. Criminal Court of Cook
(5)Art.VI Sec. 12. (6)Art.VI Lec. 18. (71 Art VI Sec 11

( 11)Court. ^ One clerk of the Superior Court; term of office four
years. ^''^^
County officers.
Board of county cornmisEionert ; three members, term of
office three years. In Cook County said board is composed of
fifteen persons. ^^^^ Also, the offices of sheriff, treasurer,
coroner and clerk of circuit court are created. In counties
of over sixty thousand population one recorder of deeds is elected.
Term of office of each, four years. (^'^)
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C H A P T R III.
Ll£GI£LATIVl': OOKTROL OVER STATUTORY CFI'ICiS.
The Constitution cor.tairis no express limitation upon
the power cf the legislature to create new offices. i;ew govern-
mental functions arise witli the development of the state and their
performance is met by the creation of statutory offices. V^ien
established, they assume a status differing from constitutional
offices, not in the nature of their functions, but in tiie nature
and extent of the control which the legislature may exercise over
them. The authority which enacts may provide the method by
which the enactment shall be carried into effect, or the authority
which enacts may repeal. The pnly limitation by which the
legislature is bound must be in the Constitution, hereafter to be
noted. With this exception, as was said in the case of The
People V. Loeffler(^), "An office created by statute is wholly
within the control of the legislature and unless forbidden by the
Constitution, the length of the tern and the mode of appointment
may be altered at pleasure."
The legislature not only has ^ower to create offices
by regularly enacted statutes, but if it appears from the facts
or previously enacted statutes that even the intent of the legis-
lature was that such office should exist, tiie courts will recognize
and give legal effect to it. \;ii^re the Constitution of 1348
failed to create the office of coroner, as had been done by the
previous one, the court held in Blanchard v. \Vood(-), that although
there had been no express declaration tnat such office should be
continued, the intention to do so was manifest by provisions which
(1) "175 Til. 5857™ Uri9Tir7''37T [
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required official acts to be performed by such an officer.
With respect to the creation ofoffices, the intent of tlie legis-
lature stands the same as regularly enacted statutes.
As incident to the power to create, the legislature has
authority to abolish any statutory office. The power vested
in the General Assembly to enact laws necessarily implies the cor-
responding right to repeal any of its previous acts. Kor is
the legislature bound not to repeal an act establishing an office
until the term for which the incumbent was chosen shall have ex-
expirec. In the People v. Auditor of Tublic Accounts(3)^
where mandamus was sought to compel payment of salary for that
portion of the term after the office had been abolished, the court
hela that it was competent for tlie legislature to repeal a law
creating an office before the expiration of the term and after such
repeal the officer was entitled to no further compensation.
The legislature may create and abolish such offices at
will, but it is under one constitutional restriction as to the
body which is to act as the appointing power. The Oonstitu-
tion('^)provides tiiat the governor shall nominate, and by and with
the advice anc, consent of the senate, appoint all officers whose
offices are established by the Constitution or by statute, and
whose anpointment is not otherwise providec for; but in no case
shall any officer be appointed or elected by the general assembly.
By this provision, the power of appointment which was fornerly
exercised by the legislature under the earlier Constitution, is
entirely withdrawn. The body is allowed to choose its own
officers by special constitutional grant. (5)
(3) 1 Scam. 585. (4) Art. V Cec. 10. (5) Art. IV Gee. 9.
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Eeveral cases, however, have arisen in which the ±ou,1l-
lature has atteniiUed to exercise the power. In Howard v.
£t. Clair Go. Levee and Drainage 3o.^^), the corporation was de-
clared illegal on the ground that the coninissioners composing it
had been ("iroot appointed by the xee,i slature
.
Axtiiough the legislature p^ay not itself appoint, it has
has been held that tiie constitutional limitation just considered
does not apply when adcitiorax duties are imposed upon already
existing officers. In The People v. Ctooksy^'^), it was held
that this power might be legally exercised. The case involved
facts similar to the above, but in fhe act it was provided that the
county commissioners should, by virtue of their office, act as
drainage commissioners in and for their respective counties.
As further illustrative of tlie exercise of this power, a statute^'^^
provides tiiat treasurers of counties under township organization
shall be ex officio county collectors of their respective counties.
Under the above decision there is a plain distinction made between
designating certain inoiviauals to perform certain duties and the
imposition of new duties upon existing officers. It is clear,
therefore, that the legislature may, from time to time, impc.... -
ditional duties upon officers ao.cin^ statutory offices, and the
one thus performing them is not regarded as holding but one office.
The same will be true as to constitutional offices, unless the
legislature is prohibited expressly or impliedly from addi^ig to
the powers of offices created by the Constitution.
The legislature exercises an additional control over the

- il -
method of filling office& by the Consti tution ( 9) which provides
that the governor and senate shall appoint all officers not other-
Mse. Exovlded for; thus allowing tiie legislature, when creating
an office, to provide for the manner in whic.i it shall be filled,
or, in case of appointment, to vest sucli power in any officer of
either of the departments of government. It seems that the
power of appointment may thus be exercised without contravening
the rule of law as to the separation of governmental powers.
In The People v. V/illiams^ ^^)
,
it was said that the original
power to appoint all officers resided with the people. The
governor, by the above provision, is given some appointive power,
and, though usually conceived of as properly belonging to this
department, it is by no means inherent in the executive, but may
only be exercised to the extent wh.ich is delegated, either by the
,
Constitution or legislative enactment. The reasoning is con-
firmed by the case of The People v. Hoffman^
, in which it was
srid: "In the absence of some constitutional provision, the power
to appoint may, if the statutes so provide, be exercised for any
class of officers by any of the three governmental departments."
It is immaterial whether the power thus delegated is to make origi-
nal appointments, or to fill vacancies in offices which originally
are elective.
It has been a common practice of the legislature to em-
power the courts to appoint many minor officials, such as park
commissioners, commissioners of elections, or of drainage districts,
(9) Art. V sec. 10. (10) 51 111. 63. (H) ue IllTssV'
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supreme court reporters, masters in cliancery and similar officers.
In two leading cases^ ^^) the exercise of this power was strongly
objected to, on the ground that the judge, in making tlie appoint-
ment, was exercising an executive or political power, when, by
the Constitution, courts were prohibited from exercising any but '
judicial functions. This argument was answered by saying
that the Constitution provided that these courts should have jur-
isdiction in certain matters, and such oJ,hej? JjirisiiiiLtion a^ may.
M SXOxiAeA M law. Thus implying that the legislature might
vest power in the courts which need not necessarily be judicial
in its nature. Furthermore, the court argued that there was
no provision declraing that the appointment of a municipal officer
is the exercise of a legislative or executive power, and that the
... ipower to appoint is, by no means, an executive function, unless i
i
made so by the fundamental law or by legislative act. Political'
power was said to be the policy of government and that it could be \
exercised by either department, and as all departments aid in the
administration of the government., the court then concluded that
|
if the power to appoint is a political power, the eonstitution
|,
does not prohibit its exercise because it is political. The
court further says, in dictum, that the power might be sustained
on the ground that it was the act of an individual, ana not done
in his official capacity. The court, in The People v. Morgan, ,
sums it up by saying that "Whether the appointment of the park
jcommissioners be the exercise of a judicial, ministerial or other
!
(12) People V. Morgan, 90 111. 558, on the appointment of park
commissioners by the court.
People V. Hoffman, 116 111. 587, on the appointment of
election commissioners by the court.

- lo -
I unc Lion
,
w lie L lie r it be the act of an officer or an
!
indiviaual,
;
we are of opinion that the power was well conferred
i
and might
properly be exercised by the circuit judge." At all events,
the decisions establish the fact that the legislature may legally
delegate the appointive power.
Thereis one limitation upon the exercise of this power,
however. Although the legislature may use its discretion
in conferring the power of appointment upon public officials or
agencies, it is not permitted to confer it upon ordinary corpora-
tions which are not connected with the administration of govern-
ment. This was decided in the case of Lasher v. The People ^-^"^i
A statute created a board of inspectors from which all commission
merchants in Chicago were to obtain licenses. Members of the
board were to be elected, one from the Illinois Dairy Association,
Retail Dealers Association, and other like organisations. The i
law wqs held unconstitutional for the reason, that, as the power
to appoint is a franchise, it was an attempt to confer a special
privilege or franchise upon a corporation, which act is prohibited
by the state Gonsti tution
.
^ -^"^'^ As to the conferring of this
power upon single private corporations, the court said that such a
;
law was without precedent in tliis state. . Under this decision,
j
however, such a law as is in force in Indiana, which allows t'le '
I
Ctate Dental Association to appoint the board of state dental ex-
j
( 15
1
ammers^ would no doubt be held unconstitutional.
After the legislature has created an office, and desig-
nated the manner in which it shall bo filled, it is not prohibited
from subsequently changing the method originally specified.
(13) 183 111.226. (14) Art. Ill Sec. 22. (15) 156 Ind. 187.
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It may ,:;onfer tlio power of appointment upon other officers, nay
provide for election in lieu of appointment, or vice versa.
In The People v. V;'right, where the constitutionality of the act
v/hich provided that the commissioners of the board of police of
Chicagoshould be appointed by the mayor, instead of elected by
the people, as formerly done, was in question, the court held the
act valid. The argument was based on the fact tiiat, as the
board was the creature of the legislature, it could, in its discre-
tion, proviae how the members should be chosen, and could change
the mode from, time to time. Tlie Constitution, being silent
on the point, the legislature possessed full power to act as the
welfare of the city seemed to demand. The legislature has
also provided that hereafter all park commissioners shall be ap-
pointed by the governor instead of by tiie judges of the circuit
courts
.
As a further power of the legislature in delegating
appointment, it may provide the qualifications which must be pres-
ent before officers may appoint their subordinates, by bringing
this class under civil service r\iles. Such a law is not a
complete withdrawal of tlie power vested in officers to make ap-
pointments in tiie various departments over which they have charge,
but it constitutes a qualification to the extent of requiring all
appointments to be made from among those v;ho had met all the re-
quired conditions. The validity of the civil service law was
affimed in Loeffler v. The Peopie^^^), It was here contended
that the law was invalid by reason of t-ie additional "test" pre-
scribed. The Constitution^ prescribes that all officers must
(16) 175 111. 535. (17) Art. V Gee. 25
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take oath, but that no other oath, declaration or test shall be re-
required as a qualification for office. But the court maintalred
tliat the tern "test", as here used, had reference to additional
oatlis the two terms being used synonomously , and the test required
by the act ir question was not included nor prohibited by this pro-
vision. It was also seriously urged that the tenure of such
offices was not recognized by the Constitution, as such positions
might be held indefinitely or during good behavior. The
clause ^ -'-^) referred to defines an office as a pubj-ic posit ion i .
continuing during the pleasure of the appointive power or for a
fixed time. The court held that, as the civil service act
dealt only with the public service incities, tov;ns and villages,
and had no reference to the public service of t.ie state, to v/hich
tiie definition cited applied, such positions were more like places
of employment than offices. Consequently, it was fully compe-
tent for the legislature to prescribe such regulations.
The legislature, in creating an office,' may define the
duties and powers thereof and may prescribe the lim.it s within which
they may be lawfully exercised. As an agency of government
under the control of the legislature, such officer may not exceed
the authority which :ias been af f iiTiative'ly delegated. But if,
in any case, where the evident intent of the legislature indicates
that duties shall be performed in addition to those affirmatively
imposed, the exercise of such additional power is deemed strictly
legal. In The People v. Thurber^ -^^i
,
it was contended that the
act creating the county courts was repealed by the law itself, on
(18) Art. V Cec.
. (19) 13 Ilj.. 554.
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the ground tliat there had been no express declaration that the
duties formerly exercised by the clerk of tlie county commissioners'
court should be assumed by the clerk of tue county court.
Many of the duties required of this officer, outside those in con-
nection with the jurisdiction of the court, were important, such as
issuing notices of elections, keeping of poll-books, canvassing
the votes, and issuing certificates of election. The court
lield, however, that from the very nature of tlie duties and from
the fair construction of the statute, the intention of the legisla-
ture was that the county clerk should be the successor of the clerk
of the county commissioners* court, and should perform all the
duties incident to the otxier office.
From this survey it is seen th.at the legislature exer-
cises practically a complete control over offices of its own cre-
ation. It may create, abolish, define, add to, and take away
duties; fix the method of appointment or election, subject to
change at pleasure. In none of the case examined has the con-
trol attempted been denied. .In the absence of constitutional
restrictions, statutory offices are entirely subordinated to tiie
will of the legislature.
i
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G li A P T ^ R IV.
PO\)vlR OF TIE GOVi<:RKOR TO APFCIKT.
By far the greatest amount of appointive power under the
state government is exercised by the governor, by and with the ad-
vice and consent of the senate. The power is by no means
inherent in the executive, but may only be exercised to tiie extent
delegated by the Constitution or legislative action. From the
fomer the governor has power to nominate, and by and with the ad-
vice and consent of the senate appoint, all officers whose offices
are created by the Jonstitution , or which may be created by law,
and whose appointment or election is not otherwise provided for(l).
This provision has been construed by the court in The People v.
Loeffler(^) to apply only to state offices, and again, in the
People v, Llorgan^*^^, it was held that this provision "refers to
officers performing duties for the state, as contradistinguished
from county, city and township officers. It is applicable to
offices created by the Constitution, and not otherwise provided
for, and to new offices created by the general assem.bly, and not
required to be filled in some other manner. But it has no
application to municipal government." This allows the gov-
ernor to appoint officers without the concu ^ro^ce of the senate,
when authorized by statute, f'^)
The same power, thus derived, may be exercised in filling
vacancies in offices which may or may not have been elective, and
in making original appointments. An office becomes vacant
(l)Art.V Sec. 10. (2) £upra. (3) Supra.
(4) \vilcox V. The People, 90 111. 186.

- 18 -
I
upon the occiirronce of any of the following acts, to-wit^^)*:
deatli, resignation, by beooming insane, by ceasing to be an inhab-
|
itant of the state, district, county, town or precinct, as the
case may be, on the conviction of infamous crime, or of any offense '
involving a violation of official oath, removal from office, refus-
j
al or neglect to take the x^rescribed oath of office, to give or re-
|
new official bond, or to deposit or file such oath or bond within
the time prescribed by lav/, or by the decision of a competent tri- '
bunal, declaring an election void.
As tc who may determine when a vacancy has occurred, it
is further provided that when it is alleged that a vacancy in any
! i
office exists, the officer, court or county board, whose duty it
j
is to fill such vacancy, shall have power to determ.ine whether
the facts occasioning such vacancy exist. The above pro-
visions are, therefore, not self -executory
. Some discretion
is allowed the appointive power which must be exercised before
the new appointment is made.
The power of the executive to make appointments to fill
vacancies extends in all the principal state offices the office
of lieutenant-goverr^or excepted. The Constitution provides( '7)
when a vacancy shall have occurred in the office of secretary of
state, auditor of public accounts, treasurer, attorney-general,
superintendent of public instruction and a statute passed in
pursuance of this article, adds the state board of equalization—
the governor shall appoint to fill the vacancy. By statute^^)
the governor is given the power to fill a vacancy in the office of
judge in either the supreme, circuit, superior court of Cook
(5) R.S.1903 3h.46, £ec.lki4. (6) R.C. 1908 Oh. 46, Sec. 126
I (7) Art. V Sec. 20. (3) R.S. 1908 Oh. 46, Sec. 151.
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County, or county courts, if within one year of the date of the
expiration of the terrn; if more than a year, a nev; election must
be lield . A like provision is made as to judges of probate
courts
.
In an early case ( 10) tlie te rm"vacanGy" was held not to :
mean an original vacancy. The office must have been previously
j
filled before a vacancy could occur therein. In the particular
j
case, a statute created an office to be filled by appointment by
\
the governor and concurrence of the senate, vacancies therein to
be filled by the governor alone. The senate , having adjourned
before the office v.as filled, the acting governor, under his power
to fill vacancies, made an appointment. The case arose on man-
|
damus to compel the secretary of state to sign the commission, and
the court held that the governor had no right to fill an office
during a recess of the general assembly, where there never liad
been an incumbent. The court regarded the term, "vacancy" as
contradistinguished from filled or occupied.
A summary of the offices created by statute to which
the governor appoints, follows
(9) R.C. 1908 Oh. 37 Sec. 239. (IC) People V. Forquer, 1 111.^04.
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1 A i a. _l (.3 in ^ officers are appointed by the governor
by and with tlie advice and consent of t na S enate
;
Office Number of
Members
J- e rm
years
in Citation
R. s. innR
ooirjuissioners oi Canals 3 2
Page
220
S.eG tion
1
of Public
^ 1 ICI i X Li X O u 5 244 2
" of the Penitentiary 3 2 1592 4
" cf Labor Statistics 5 2 216 1
" of Railways and
Warehouse s 3 o 1696 167
" of Live Stock 3 o 153 47
" of Highways 3 2 2050 1
Fish Commissioners 3 3 1119 17
State Architect 1 171 13
Trustees of State Insti-
tutions 3 6 247 25
" of Industrial Home
the Blind
for
5 o£. 258 94
" of State Normal 5 • A 19 79 401
State Board of Health 7 7 2010 1
State Board of Pharmacy 5 5 1411 27
" Arbitration 3 3 165 19
Managers of the State Re
forma tory 5 10 1736 2
Public Administrators one for each oounty 4 112 44
Officers to enforce law
against cruelty to animals o 151 24
Notaries Public 4 1483 1
Grain Inspector 1 2 1690 146

- JiG a -
The following officers are appointed by the governor
alone
:
Office Number ofIvle;n.bers
CommissionerE of Good Roads
of Deeds
Trustees of the Soldiers*
and Sailors' Home
State Veterinarian
Public Printer
Park CommisBioners
Board of Dental Surgery
Commissioners of Uniform
State Laws
3
1
1
Military Officers
Factory Inspector 1 Assistant and
18 Deputies
Director of Pawners Society 1
State Food Gomnissioner 1
Fish V/ardens 5
State Board of Examiners of
Registered Nurses 5
Term in
yea rs
Citation
Pa^e Section
XMl 337
484 1 and5
262
154
2024
1521
1414
2118
2058
103 7
575
2037
1115
1486
116
49
21
58
35
18
5
20
186
1
4
1
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CHAPTER V.
POWijlR OF TirJ: COURTS Ii: 00KT3£T2:D ELi^GTIONS.
The purpose of this chapter is to determine the ex.tent
of the jurisdiction of the courts in deciding cases of contested
elections. There are two methods by which the legality of
title to office
,
dependent upon an election, may be determined
.
First, by the common xa.. remeay, quo warranto; second, by the
special proceeding to contest the election. In the former
the suit is brought by the people to test the validity of the
then incumbent, but does not decide who is entitled to tiie office.
In the latter the suit is between, and instituted by the contestants
and the question of who possesses the requisite majority of votes
is determined
.
,
The following provisions have been made, designating the
tribunals which may hear and determine cases of contested elections.
TiiG legislature in joint meeting hear and determine con-
tested elections of governor, lieutenant-governor, secretary of
state, auditor of public accounts, treasurer, superintendent of
public instruction, and attorney-general (1)
The Senate and House of Representatives determine con-
tests of their respective members. (^)
The Circuit Court determines contests of elections of
judges of the Supreme Court, clerks of the Supreme Court, judges
of the Circuit Court, judges of the Superior Court of Cook County,
and members of the State Board of I^qualization . (
(l)R.S. 1908, p. 927, sec.94. (2)Const.Art.V Sec. 4.
^^^p'ggs^sec 97

o o
The circuit courts in their respective counties and
the Cuperior Court in .^look County determine contests of judges of I
i
county courts, mayors, presidents of county boards and presidents i
of villages
.
The county courts determine contests of all county, town-
ship and precinct officers and all other officers for the contest-
ing of whose election no provision has been made.^^^
Most of the casesof contested elections in Illinois
arise under the special proceeding. Though expressly provided
for by statute, it is not an exclusive remedy.
.
On this point
there is some disagreement in other states, but the court in Illi-
nois has held, in Snowball v. The Peop le ^ ^) that in the absence
of constitutional restrictions, the jurisdiction of the courts
to proceed by informations in the nature of quo warranto is not
taken away by the statute which prescribes the special proceeding.
The proceeding to contest an election is in the nature
of a suit in chancery. It is not an appeal from the board of
canvassers, but an original proceeding going behind the canvass.
The board, v/hose decision is sought to be overturned by the con-
test, is a ministerial and not a judicial body.(Q) Its power
extends only to declaring the results shown by the certificates
submitted to them by the judges of the election. Come dis-
cretion,, however, is allowed in the examination of the returns.
When not submitted in the proper form they may be rejected by the
|
board . (9) In a case where it is not claimed that any of the
votes were illegal or wrongly counted, the court will not set
(5) R.G. 1908 p. 928, sec. 98. (6)14 111. 260.
(7) People V. Head, 25 111. 287. (3) People v .liilliard , 29 111.413,

aside the finding made by the board cf canvassers simply on the
ground that tiiey Iiad acted on insufficient evidence as to the cor-
rectness of the returns ^ -^^^ '^hi ^ .- fi . v. x . .iL. ivui.ito, a U s cij_i.ov<L the board to deternine
vvnetlier tiie returns have been nade in the proper legal form. In
all other respects the duties of the canvassers are simply ninic;-
terial; they must declare elected the one v.ho, according to the
election returns, has the requisite majority.
In cases of contested elections the question before the
court is the determination of who was legally elected. All
other questions of eligibility are excluded.
. The burden of
proof is on the contestant to show that he has been elected for "the
certificate of the board of canvassers is a prima facie right to
office. Vvhere the contestant is the out-going officer, mandamus
will lie to compel him to surrender the office, pending the de-
cision of the court in th.e contest . ^ "'"^^
The courts are under very few restrictions as to the ad-
missibility of evidence. Usually, any evidence will be allowed
if the court can be shown that it bears upon the question at issue.
When the ballots are opened and counted in court and the result
thus found differs from the certificate made by the board of can-
vassers, the question of tlie relative' importance which is to be
attached to this finding and the returns of the election is before
the court. From the very object and nature of the contest there
has been no rule laid down which will make one take precedence over
the other in all cases. In Dooley v. Van riohenstein( 13)
, where
Ii-._Lr.??^.i^^^.^" il^il^ as^made by the judges of election
(l$))Oounty of Lawrence v. Scl^aulhausen, 123 111 321(IDGreenwood v Murphy, 151 111. 604; question of legal residence
/•,o^T. ^^^-'-^
be raised m a contest of an election(12)People V. Head, 25 111. 287. (13) 170 111 630
*
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ar.u slicnvn by tuuir r^t\ir:.i. i.iior,.U\ prevail, over the oovv.t made by
the circuit court from the ballots was fairly before tiie court, it
was helc that neither should be conclusive in all cases. Here
the returns did net prevail over tiie count by the court.
In deciding which of the tv/o shall be conclusive, the
i
court will examine into all the circumstances attendant upon the
election which tend to establish or discredit the returns, and wiix
aibo admit aa.1 evidence which bears upon the preservation of the i
ballots.
j
As a goneral ruj.e t.ia ballots are the best evidence of I
of an election when it appears that they have been preserved accord-|
ing to statute. j^ven in cases where the returns and ballots i
both have been discredited, the count in court is considered of j;
more importance. In Collier v. Anlicker^ -^'^) , where the returns
showed a tie vote, there was some evidence that the ballots had
not been cared for as provided by statute. There was also a
||
difference of one vote as shown by the poll-lists and the returns, j'
thus showing some carelessness on the part of the judges, but the
ballots were held to be the better evidence, but only after an ox- i.
amination rf the poll-lists, ballots, and all circumstances devel-
oped by the testimony. ' -
|
From Jotron v. Jrov. ^-^^^ it a.nnears that although the
|
I
ballots have been discredited i they cannot be excluded by the
i
triaj. court. On t:ie contest there was no evidence to show
j
that the returris v.ere incorrect, but tlie ballots wore discredited
j
'i
because they had not been sealed and had been kept in an unlocked jl
i
building over night, but it was held not to be sufficient for the
(14) 139 111. 34. (15) 164 111. ^0.
j;

lower court to refuse to accept them as evidence. Here the
retxims were considered as better evidence than the ballots.
In Beali v. Aibert^^^'), where there was evidence to show that the
ballots could have been tampered with and that the envelope in
which they had been kept was partially tom, the returns of the
judges prevailed over tlie ballots. But when the ballots have
been sealed and so remain, and though kept in a place easy of ac-
cess and there is no evidence tc show that they had been tampered
with, they will be regarded by tiie court as the better evidence .( -^7)
In all cases, then, the ballots, as counted in couft, will be the
stronger evidence of the result of an election, except where there
is a strong presumption that they have been tam.pered with since
the election, when at the same time it appears that the judges
thereof had not been careless and had observed all the r^rovisions
of the statute in making up the returns. If both are dis-
credited, the result is determined by all the outside evidence
which bears upon the actual result.
When fraud has been practiced in an election, it must be
shown that it affected the actual result, before the court will
set it aside. An example on the point tiiat the courts
will carefully examine the character and extent of fraud is that
of Sorenson v. Corenson^ ^^)
.
Here it was proven that twenty-
eight voters had been persuaded to leave ^heir residences in an
adjoining precinct, and were given temporary employment in the
village. The court was of opinion that it was an attempt to
coloniae voters for purposes of the election, and that, although
they "nad resided in the village tlie required lengMi of time, their
(16)159 ill. 127. {lT)l^^ir'v^"JaroroH^
(18) City Pf ,^hica:,n V. P^np1^, fin t 1 1 dQfi. ( 1Q\ .1R9 m. 179. i
|
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residence there was only of a temporary nature which gave them
no right to vote
.
The qiiestion of the identity of the individual ballots
is also before the court. If it is alleged that they have
been changed since the election, parol evidence is admissible to
establish their condition at the time they v/ere cast. A
single instance in Kreitz v. Behrensraeyer^ ^^Kvill suffice.
Here the Cupreme Court overruled a ruling of the lov.er court in
refusing to admit as evidence the statements of a voter which
were to the effect that he voted a ballot ' bearing a certain numb-
er and the name of a candidate differing from the one then in
evidence. The court held that it should iiave been counted
for the candidate whose name it first bore. Though affirming
that a voter could not be allowed to say for whom he voted, when
ills ballot, which showed no evidence of change, appeared other-
wise, t}ie court said: "It is always competent to show that the
most solemn writings are forgeries; and a ticket which has been
changed by a paster to read as a vote for a man for a particular
office differinj, from the man for whom it read as a vote in the
condition in which it was when cast, is a forgery." V/here
certain ballots, corresponding to numbers on the poll-book, are
missing on the recount, it is competent to show by parol evidence
that the said voters whose names appeared on the poll-books voted
for a certain candidate.
The question of the admission and rejection of individu-
al votes is always up for the determination of the court, but each
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vote is accepted as prima facie legal. Therefore, before the
courts will reject a vote, it must appear by rebutting evidence
that it was cast by an illegal voter or that it does not comply
with the ballot law. It appears from the case just cited
and from many others that any evidence is aumissible which tends
to show a lack of legal qualification of one voting at an election.
Such a ballol? will be rejected by the court when recounted at the
contest. Under this the votes of non-residents, of those not
registered, of students when they had not established a permanent
abode, cf those who had not been in the precinct, county or state
the required length of time, and of unnaturalized persons, have
been rejected as the votes of illegal voters.
There is a possible exception to the above rule as to the
acceptance of declarations of voters as evidence tending to show
that they had voted illegally. In City of Beardstown v. City
of Virginia(21) it was said that there was but little judicial
authority on the subject and that conflicting. Here the
declarations cf voters as to their own disqualification for voting,
when made subsequent to the election, were not admissible, while
the declarations of voters made prior to and at the time of the
election were admissible. The element of time seemed to be the
determining feature. But the court went on to declare that
the holding in that case must be confinea to it and net accepted
as a general rule. The rule was followed in Kreita v. Behrens-
meyer, but under a strict construction. On the question of
residence such declarations were admissible when made prior to the
election, but were not regarded as conclusive.
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It is a general rule in contested elections tliat a legal
voter cannot be compelled to divulge the name of the person for
whom he voted. But it is doubtful whether this exemption ex-
tends to persons v;ho were not legal voters. In Sorenson v.
Gorenson it was held that it was error to compel Vvitnesses to tes-
tifyas to how they voted, but it was not regarded as sufficient to
reverse the decision. Since these votes determined, the result
of the election, and that they were proven to be illegal votes,
it might be inferred that persons who liac voted illegally could be
compelled to testify for whom they voted.
In the court's examination of the ballots, the leading
question is, V;hat was tiie intention of the voter?. If that
can be determined, it should control, and effect must be given
to that intention. The only grounds upon which a ballot may
be rejected, is v;lien the intent of the voter is not clear, and
when the marking would furnish a means of identification. As
to the first, tlie court v/ill not reject a ballot when the name
( 99\pronounced as spelled is similar, to the correct pronunciation.^ ^
It has also been held t;iat v/here votes have been cast for police
magistrate, where the election was for police justice, the ballots
v;ere properly counted for the latter office. (^3)
T]ie courts are more strict when a ballot has been im-
properly marked. Here a statute expressly provides for the man-
ner in v/hich ballots must be marked, and when there appears to be
any appreciable difference, such that the ballot could afterward
be identified, the courts will reject it,
(22) Behrensmeyer v. Kreitz, 135 111, 591.
(23) reople v. Matte son, 17 111. 167.
4
I
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H A P T IL R VI.
*
POWER OF RJlLiOVAL.
As the incumbent of an office possesses no property or
vested right in the office which he holds, the legislature may pro-
vide for his removal before the expiration of the term for v/hich
he was chosen. Using the difference in the nature of the re-
moving body as a basis of classification, the power of removal may
be exercised either by impeachment, by executive or administrative
action, by legislative acts and by judicial procedure.
Tlie first method is not strictly judicial, but more
properly in the nature of a quasi or special judicial proceeding.
The Constitution of Iliinois^-^) provides that the House of Repre-
sentatives shall have the sole power of impeaciiment , such impeach-
ments to be tried only by the Senate. Judgments in such cases
extend to removal from office and to disqualification from holding
any office of honor, profit or trust under the governm.ent of tiie
state. An officer, so tried, whether convicted or acquitted,
is still liable to criminal prosecution. Tiie Constitution
further provides that all civil officers of the state shall be
liable to impeacliment for any misdemeanor in office.^*^^
The question then arises, V-ho are civil officers? So
far as is known, there has been no case of impeachment in Illinois,
nor have the courts ever had occasion to mark out the limits of the
tenn "civil of f icers" . The only case in which tixc question has re-
ceived any consideration is that of Donahue v. County of V. ilx.^"^^
(1) Art. Ill Sec. 24. (2) Art. V Sec . 15. (5) 100 111. 94.

Here the court took exception to the argument that the county
treasurer, being tiie incumbent of an office, created by the Const i-
tion, couxG only be removed by impeacliment
. The court held that
the fact that an office was created by the Constitution was not in
j
itself sufficient to make the incumbent thereof liable to impeach-
J^s^t
.
It is therefore evident that the source from which an
officer derives his authority is not necessarily detenriining ; this '
element, then, must be in the nature of the function possessed by 1
the officer.
,
The question has, however, been raised in other states,
and the opinions on which, from the similarity of the provisions,
might be regarded as applicable to Illinois. In in rs Opinion
of the Justices, to the query whether the county conmissicnar
was an officer subject to impeachment, the court replied that in
their opinion such an officer did not come within the meaning of
the impeachment clause. This opinion, th.en, agrees with t.iG
the holding of the Illinois court, but whereas in the latter, no
definite reason was advanced in 'support of the decision, the Mas-
sachusetts court regarded the impeaci-iment provision as applicable
i
only to tiiose officers elected by thQ people at xarge cr provided '
for in the constitution .for the administration of matters of gen-
eral concern. Granting the correctness of the opinion, it
seems probable that the clause referred to would have no further
I
application in Illinois than to officers of the executive depart-
ment^^) and to judges of the Cupreme Court.
[
The Conate, when sitting as a court to try impeachments,
|
is one of original and exclusive juri suiction
. In in re Opinion i

cf the Ju£Lice£(^), where the governor had been impeachod and the
Senate had adjourned before' final cispotition of the ca^y u.g
been made, the question was asked of the court, v<het?ier the ad-
journment of the Cenate conetituted an acquittal. It v;as the
opinion of the justices that the case must of necessity be still
pending before the Cenate and would be until finally disposed of
by that body and by that body alone. The opinion stated,
"The Cenats is a oo-^rt r-P ex^lurive, original and fina^ juri :; i c t
-
tlon, and its judgments can become the subject cf reversal ox re-
viev. in no otiier court known to the Constitution ar lavv
.
After
an lmpeach!;'e" t
,
perfected according to the Oonsti tut i . , . the whole
matter is v.it:i the Cerate, and it has tlie exclusive right of de-
termining all questions which may arise in the case." Al-
thougli tae courts do not liave jurisdiction for final determination
of suca a cause, the opinion further states that in a proper case,
if it could be shown that the action of the Cenate was unconstitu-
tional, tne courts reserve the power to declare such action null
and void, and furt;iernore
,
tliat^taeir action coui-d be maoc^ tae
subject of a suit in a coj-lateral proceeding, but, then, only to
the extent of determining w}\ether the action of the Cenate had
been final or not. The court could r; * review tlie facts to
see whether tiie decision was warranted, if it appeared that the
Senate was acting within its constitutional powers.
Removal by the Executive,
The Constitution of 1313 gave the power to the governor
to appoint the secretaiv of state, but did not provide for any
(6) 14 Fla. 289
.

of removal of that officer. It conter.c.eu in t.ie cc.'.o of
Field V, The People ( )( 1859 ; that the governor hac, by virtue of
his pov;er to appoint, likewise the pov/er to remove said officer
j
and to appoint a Euccecsor at will. The court held, however,
i
that the appointing power had neither expressly nor hy necessary I
implication the power to remove from office. It was further
held t}iat, "when once appointed the power of appointment is sus-
pended until a vacancy occurs."
But the Constitution of 187o(^)makes the power of re-
moval from office co-extensive with the power of appointment, by
giving to the governor the power to remove any officer whom he may
appoint for any of the tliree following causes; incompetency, neg-
lect of duty, and malfeasance i7i office, and the power to declare
the office vacant and to fill the same by appointment as provided
in other caseS' of vacancies. But this clause is not a limita-
tion upon the extent of the power, fo''- there is j...:lain9r' i-r> this
provision no prohibition upon the legislature from declaring that
the governor may remove other officers not appointed by him.
As illustrative of the point, an act of the legislature mokes it
compulsory for the governor to remove any sheriff who has allowed
a prisoner to be taken from his custody by a mob and lynched.
Nor does the statute make such action dependent upon so:^e hearing
being given. The statute referred to has never been uefore the
|
courts, but serious doubtsmay be entertained as to its validity.
The office of sheriff is one created by tlie Constitution with a
tenure therein p„ne Si3.clbeci . The Constitution contains no
(7) Lcam. 79. (8) Art. V Cec. IL
.

- 33 -
;
provision for the removal of a sheriff. Therefors, if the
statute is vaj.id, it allows the legislature to provice for the re-
moval of the said officer before the expiration of the term for
which he was chosen, in contravention of that clause in the funda- *
mental a.av. which fixes tlie tenure of the office.^^) The cita-
tions found in Rich v. Jochim( 1^0 are here applicable. It v,as
there said: "And it (the legislature) may lodge the power to re-
move from statutory offices in boards or ctlier officers, subject
to statutory regulation. And, v.liile in cannot remove incum-
bents of constitutional offices, it is not because 'of an inherent
difference in the ^^uaxities of the office, but because the power
|
i
to remove is limited to the power that creates. There is
....the sam.e power to abolisii the office or roncv--;; t.'-;e officer
M. ajlLendmerit oX the Jonstitution ." Further on in the decision
it is f-tated: '''All statutory offices are taken subject to legisla-
tive action, so all constitutional offices are tal:e-- 'ubject to
constitutional changes." Thus the quotations given leave the I
strong impression that the tenure of an office, fixed by the Con-
stitution, can only he effected by changes in the fundamental ^aw
itself, and not by xegislativo enactment, as here attempted.
If the reasoning is correct, the governor's power of removal can
only extend to officers whom lie appoints and to those officers
holdir:^ statutory offices, made removable by the governor by the
statute itself.
The governor may exercise the power of appointment by
either of two metiiods: appointment witli tlie concurrence of the
Cenate, and, when authorised by statute, witliout the concurrence
(9) Art, X r.ftn R ( in) 99 jvijo,^
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of the Senate. His power of removai, by the Constitution,
extends tc both classes. This was the opinion of the court
in the case of Wiicox v. The People^^). A statute had con-
ferred exclusive power upon the governor to appoint park commis-
sioners, but provided that they should be subject to removal by
the circuit court. Tiie new Jonstitu t ion { 1870} then coming in-
to effect, the executive, in pursuance to the powers therein grant-
ed, removed said park connissioners
. It was contended that the
governor's power to remove according to this artipie did not ex-
tend tc this class of officers, but applied only to those appointed
with the concurrence of tiie Cenate. The court adopted the con-
struction tiiat it appxied to botii classes alike and said; "The
power of the governor to remove officers appointed by him for in-
competency, neglect of duty cr malfeasance in office, and fill the
vacancy caused thereby, is not confined to officers appointed by
him, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, but it ex-
tends to all officers appointed by the governor under the lau
,
whether with or without the concurrence of tlie Senate."
As to what constitutes or is included in the terms
incompetency, neglect of duty, and malfeasance in office, or as to
||
what method is necessary for their o.e te rjiina tion , the courts will
lay cown no rule of law; nor are they defined in the statutes.
Tvhenover any official is given power to remove for causes specifiedj
in the Constitution or statutes, that officiaj. is presumed to be
the sole jud^^e of the existence of the cause, and the method pur-
sued by iiim in oetermining such cannot be made the subject of re-
(11^ 90 111. 136.
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vi9w hy thG courts. In a proceeding where the findings of a
removing power arise, the courts will only go to the extent of de-
ter'n:iining uhetner the official has renderec a final decision, but
the facts thenselves are not made reviewable. In the case of
Wilcox V. The People, supra, it was strongly contended that re-
moval from office constituted the exercise of judicial power, and
therefore a specific charge, notice of it, opportunity for defense
and hearing, and proof to support the charge were necessary be-
fore t;ie comnissioners couj.a u.egali.y be removed.
,
The court
maintained th.at the governor could on^y remove for one of the
causes specified in the Jonstitution , but tliat his charge that it
had been done for incompetency was conclusive. The court says:
"It follows, then, that it is with the governor, who is to act in
the matter, to deter^nine himself, whether the cause of removal ex-
ists from tlie best lignts he can get, and no mode of inquiry being
prescribed for him to pursue, it rests with him to adopt that
method of inquiry and asGertain^-^ent as to the charge involved wliich
his judgment may suggest as tiio proper one. Acting under his
official responsibility, it is not for the courts to dictate to
him in what manner ho shall proceed in the performance of his
duty, his action not being subject to their revision."
These rules as laid down by the Illinois courts may be
taken as expressing a rather extreme doctrine on the power of re-
movaj., but tiiey are noticeable throughout a^.! the decisions on
t!ie question. '^he utmost discretion seems to be allowed to
the removing power.

Removaj. by Administrative Bodies.
To make for further effectiveness in administration and
to provide for an indirect control over acts of minor officials,
the legislature lias vested the power of removal in such boards as
the county supervisors, township boards, and similarly constituted
bodies. It may be exercised, not only by those bodies having
the appointive power, but it is oftentimes granted to those having
no such power. Minor officers, the tenure of whose officos is
fixed by statute, are also brought under the control of som.o ad-
ministrative body by making them subject to removal for proper
cause. As to the determination of the existence of the cause
the same summary met?iods are allowed to these agencies of govern-
ment as were noticed in the consideration of the governor's power
of removal. it-
Very few instances are found wiiere a body of this nature
is given an unqualified power of removal, and then, such provisions
are applicable only to officers of tiie lowest rank. Where the
causes are specified, they are not designed as inclusive of all
possible acts perfoiTiied by an officer, the feasibility of which
may be a subject of doubt, but are intended to embrace only those
acts of negligence or malfeasance which directly affect the inter-
;
jf -
ests of the public. Provision for the removal of officers is
necessary in order to secure the highest efficiency in the admin-
istration of public affairs.
everthelesE statutes which authorise such action are
oftentimes framed in such broad and general terms in designating
the specific causes which shall work a forfeiture of office that
they conferan almost unlim.ited power or at least allow a wide
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range of ciscretion. For example, a statute allowed the county
board to remove the county superintendent of sclicols for paino.ble
violation of law or omission of duty.^-^^ In another case t.ie sur^o
board liad the power to remove tiie county treasurer upon his refusal
to render an account, or to answer any question propounded by the
board, or when found to be a defaulter or guilty of any other mis-
conduct in office.
A more important fact, however, is that an administrative
body in exercising the power of removal must depend for its sole
authority upon constitutional or statutory provisions. The
causes enumerated are the only causes for which the board may re-
move an officer. In Clark v. The People^^)^ the county board,
having the power to remove the county treasurer for certain causes,
removed that officer for his neglect in carrying out an order is-
sued by the board. The cause alleged was not one specified
by statute and th.e court held that his removal from office was un-
authorized; that tiie county board could onj.y remove an officer,
such as the county treasurer, for one of tne causes specified in
the statute, I'or tlie reason that they did not possess the general "
power of removal.
Very rarely do statutes provide for any particular mode
of procedure for ascertaining tiie facts which constitute a cause
for removal. In cases where such is done, that is the ex-
clusive method; ail steps prescribed must be literally followed,
otherwise tlie decision of such a body, reached by a method of pro-
cedure not autliorisec, would be reviewable by the courts. ^'^^
But in all cases where the causes only are sj^ecified which are to i'
( j.)People V. Liays, 117 111. 257. (2) Donahue v . Oounty~of~¥riT,~ sup rj
.
(J) 10 ill. 21:3. (4 J Ptfupia M. I'.iayb, bupra. '*
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constitute a forfeiture of office, the removing power is given a
v.ide range of discretion, both as to the rnethocl to be employed in.
obtaining the evidence and as to determining what facts will be in-
cluded within the terms named. In some cases the administrat-
ive body has rerroved an ' incuir.ben t from his office simply upon its
own obser\'-ation that lie iiad been guilty of acts which justify re-
moval. (^J In others, a comm.ittee has been appointed to inves-
tigate and the remo^'ing power has acted upon its findings
.
^
A board may also remove from, office without sending any notice to
the incumbent that such action is to be taken(''') >
But in whatever manner the decision has been reached,,
whenever it is clear Uiat the removing body h^ad jurisdiction of
the subject and that they were acting within this, the exercise
of its discretion is not subject to review by the courts, although
there liad been no written caarges, trial or otiisr judicial pro-
cess. In the case of The People v, Higgins, where the board
of trustees of the Illinois State Tiospital had removed the medical
superintendent, the court laid oowr. the principle that it was
not necessary that specific charges be preferred against the super-
intendent, that formal notice was unnecessary, and that their actior
neeo not be based upon th.e testimony of ' k.i tnosses , nor was he en-
titled to a jury. Tlie board iiad the authority to act clearly
upon its own judgment and tiie statement of the board that it had
,
removed him for one of the causes specified wa:. sufficient proof
that sucli was the case. The court went furtlier, and said:
(5) People V. liiggins, 15 111, 110.
(6) People V, Mays, supra.
(7) Donahue v. County of V.ill, supra.
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"Ilaci the lav, boon silert as to the tenure of the office, and on
the subject of removal, we should not hesitate to hold that the
power of amotion was incidental to that of ar^pointment and that
they might remove him without assigning any i.pocific cc-ul,.;,
ever in their judgment the best interests of tlie institution
should reg.ulre it."
Again, in tiie case of The People v. I.'ays, a committee,
havin- been appointed, reported to the county board that on numer-
ous occasions the county sui^erintenden t of schools had been intox-
icated. The board, ..avi. ^ been ^=,iven power to remove for pal-
pable violation of law and omission of duty, construed the acts
of the superintendent as being an omission of duty, and thereupon
removed him from office. To the objection that such action
was an exercise of judicial power, and that the plaintiff had been
removed without competent evidence, the court said; "In such mat-
ters the beard exercises powers in the natur-:; of judicial powers,
and when such a bod;/ has jurisdiction of the subject of inquiry,
their decision, whether they sliall proceed regularly or irregularly,
will be valid in all collateral proceedings," The court
further avers that "V;hether thiE(the method employed) is the best
mode of ascertaining the guilt or innocence of tiie party whose
conduct is to be investigated, is a question as to whicii this
court need express no opinion. It is sufficient that the mode
of procuring the information adopted is within the discretion of
t'le board, and it is not for that reason, subject to review by
this court, certainly not in a collateral proceeding." As
to t!ie contention that the superintendent should ]iave been notified,
the court seems to have been of t.ie opinion tliat such should have
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been aone, but, whether tills f-::iouia be recLuired or not was a
question for legisiative Cettirnina tion , anc" not for judicial.
In the case of Donahue v. Tlie JouAty of \;ili, the county
treasurer v;as removed by the county brard of supervisors by a reso-
lution stating as their reason that the said officer v;as in arrears
to the crunty. Defendant was granted a hearing before the
board, but failed to satisfy then that lie had made no such error.
The chief objection raised against the validity of the board's
action was the same as in thie preceding case, namely, that an ex-
ecutive body such as it was could not exercise judicial power.
The court was of opinion that the delegation of such pov/er was
strictly a legislative function and therefore valid. They
said ; "Possessing legislative power, the General Assembly was fully
competent to prescribe the offenses which should work forfeiture
of office, and provide what tribunal should determine the fact."
The court cited cases of other states v.liero the same power had
been exercised without judicial process. In Tiie £.tate v.
lIcGarry ^^'^ the supervisors were given power to rem.ove the incumbent
of the office of inspector of the nouss of correction. In Tae
State V. Prince(^)the same board could remove, for cause, the clerk
of said board. In McGregor v. Board of Supervisors^ tiie
board couxu remove tae county treasurer. Furthermore, the
except wiiere the Constitution requires impeaclim.ent , in all other
case.s officers may be removed witiiout a proceeding by quo warranto
or judicial trial and judgment. The court did not attem.pt to
classify the act as either executive or judicial, but simply
said that in their opinion t'le action of the board was n^-t judicial
is. 4S6. (9)45 V<is. 610. (IC) 57 llich. 533.
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In ex pa/te That3hGr( -'-^) iwiere the county coirimissicners were given
power to remove the county clerk the court seemed to regard the
actio?- cf roroval as a ^^^in is te rial function rather than a juriicial,
Vkherean ac.ministrativ:.; body lias been given power to re-
move at will no jipecific action to that effect need be performed
in removing an officer. Cimply a rev/ appo intmo^"- 1 Is hold to
constitute a removal of the former officer. LuCii latitude
of ciscretion is iiot usually granted to the more important bodies,
but only to those having, iLit.tle authioi-ity. In liolbrook. v
.
Trustees of Township ( -^'^) a statute aliovved the board to remove the
township treasurer at pleasure. On an action of debt brought
by thie new appointee and board a-j^r'inst the for'^ier incv^-ibent, to
recover certain collections, t-ie court rendered judgment and held
that the appointment of a treasurer by the trustees was in fact a
removal of the foriner officer.
From this examination of the cases, it is clear, first,
that an adiriinistrative body, having been given the power of removal
for certain causes, i^n the sole judge of the existence of the cause
second, when no method of procedure is specified, the method a-
dopted will not bo questioned by the courts; third, that the courts
will not look to see whet.ior tl'^e facts alleged constitute suf-
ficient grounds for removal; fourth, that the only question which
is for judicial review is that of jurisdiction. The cases
are excellent examples of tiie increasing tendency toward the vest-
ing of power, formerly regarded as strictly judicial, within the
dom.ain of administrative authority. Somestates (^"^^ still
(11) 2 Oilman 167. (12) 22 111. 539.
(15) Duliarn V. Wilson, 53 I.Iich. 39L.
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regarcsstctutss
,
similar to ones considered, as 'Conferring
povvor to remove only after a nearing, although such has not been
affirmatively provided for. Such holdings are based more upon
consideration of what is regrr-lo-"' r.F. fTmuar^ontal principle r.
justice rather tuan upon strict xc^ax reasoning, but these de-
cisions have not been followed by the courts in Illinois.
Removal of Employees" under Civil Service
.
V.it.i. rospect to the control over a^-io l.,. removal o-*" r--
ployees, who uo^Ci their positions under civil service rules, civii.
service commissions exercise powers not differing 'greatly from
those of other adnin i r t native bodies. In adc'i^ir- t.iie
usual functions, they may create and abolish positions of t'nis
nature, \.hen circumstances demand it, and when done in good faith.
The abrogation of sr.ch offices, then, indirectly works ^ removal
of tue employees fi^om their positions, but in srch cases the rules
as to removal do not have to be observed. The civil service
law provides that ir :r-ost cases a hearing shall be given,, but the
sane ciscretion is a^xowed in determining what facts shall consti-
tute a cause for remova^, as is granted to other administrative
boards. Th'^ courts will, however, v iien it appears that the
law has not been literally followed, reverse the decision of the
commission on certiorari or mandamus proceedings and oi^der a re-
instatement of tiie employee. Kc '.^^^.tance of this has been
found outside proceedings arising under civil service laws, nor
are tlie petitions for mandamus and certiorpri as coninon in actions
of tliat sort.
In reviewing the action of the civil service commission,

the coui't will look olossly into the foriT^e of proced.i:re foliov;ed
by the body, and if it appears that the lav. was not strictly ob-
served tlieir decision will be reversed. The facts thomselves,
as in the preceding case.s, v.ilj. not be reviewed, for that is a
question committed exclusively to the discretion of the board.
In the case of Chicago v. The People ( -^'^^
,
a petition for mandamus
to reinstate the petitioner to the position of police patrolman
and to compel the payment of back salary, the court awarded, the
writ in so far as it related to tue reinstatem.ent , on the ground
that tlie investigation had been held byparties soii;e of whom were
not legally entitled to pass upon such cases, and that the relator
•had not been given an opportunity to be heard. The refusal to
grant tlie writ on the first plea was based on the fact that a city
cannot be compelled to pay out money when no appropriation lias
been made for that pur^'Ose, ..ai. ' . ; - , ";ore. Again, in
I
ToTiell V. Bullis^^^), upon a review by certiorari, the court held
that the board was without authority to hear the proceedings Bind
remove ar^pellee because he had not -rn vvotified. as *.r f.ie exact
time when such were to be held.
Tliere are numerous cases to show that the courts do not
attempt to decide what facts constitut!3 a cause for r^i-^oval.
In Chicago v. Gellin(lS), where a patrolman had neglected to pay
a debt within reasonable time, tiiat fact was regarded as sufficient
cause. In the case of Joyce v. The Jity of Jhicago^ ^'''^ , the
submission of a false report by the lieutneant of police was legal
(14)210 111. 84. (15) (16)124 111. App.210.
(17)216 111. 456.
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grounds foj- ro,,iova j.. , una the conimi ssion ' & action was ax^C' l ;;.-
tained in removing, an eiectricai engineer for being absent three
days from duty.^-^^) But in these casefj the court did not
attemi^t to rovio;. the facts f c r t-ie reason that their determination
was regarded as being entirely within the jurisdiction of the com-
mission.
But when the com.-ai vision has removed ur employee by an
abrogation of the position held by him, the courts will look fur-
ther t:ian to fi^^d out whether the legal steps have been followed,
by determining whether suci aorcaation xiud oujn done in good faith.
In Chicago v. Luthardt ( ' it ;vas claimed that, since no appropria-
tion had been made for a certain office, that, in effect, abolished
the office by vviiich the incum.bent was removed. 3y order of
the lower court he was reinstated, and in this case, a suit in
assumpsit for salary, the coi^rt rendered judgment. The grounds
for both decisions were that th.e office liaa not, in fact, been a-
bolislied, for th.s same duties remained and were being performed by
an officer under a different title. But in Chicago v. The
Peop j-o ^ '^C'the same objection was ur^^ed tiiat t.ie position of time-
keeper had not been abolished in good faith, because the duties
wort3 being perfor'^ed by another, but' the court here held that it
;iaa been abolisiiea for substantia^ reasons. A^ain in
Fitzsim.m.ons v. C*Meil(^-^), the appellant was not restored to the
office of superintendent of police, although when the o'ffice had
been abolished t}ie duties were still perfor-'.ec' by ot/jer officials,
•^he seeming difference in tlie decisions of the last few cases
cited is to be accounted for simply in the determine! tim of facts
TI3 )l?ammarTv ''""ci ty ~o7 " Chi c a'go , ~22^ f11.63. (19)191 T^^. 516,
( 20.) 114 111. Ap|i. 145. (21) 214 111. 4 n 'I . -
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raf.ier than in the api xication of tiie Law to tliet^e factL.
The cases Lervo to show to what extent the courts review ad-
ministrative de tenTiinations in questions of removal from offices
of this oiass.
Tiiere is one fi:rther case whicli tends to mark out a
boundary and per^iaps to define more particularly tiie rule beyond
wiiiCii the courts cannot cons ti tutionaxiy go. It is the only
instance found where the legislature has attempted to allow by
statute a riglit cf appeal from the decision of an administrative
body, botii as to the determination of facts anc in the application
of the law. The latter in all cases is allowed but the former
is considered as boing strictly within the jurisdiction of the ad-
ministrative board.
This was the case of the Jity of Aurora v. Cchoeberlein^ 'p)
where a section of the civil service act allowed an appeal from the
decision of the commissioners to the circuit court. The fire-
rnarshall, having been removed, appealed under the above statute.
The question raised was, as to fhe constitutionality of the stat-
ute under \-iiich tiie plaintiff iiad appealed, ano the court he.j_o tliQ
statute invalid as being a delegation of executive power to a
judicial body. Tiiey said: "The sootion in question purports
to authorise an appeal from an order of the boaro by any i^jrson
interested or affected, and if it should be sustained, it wouxd
result in the circuit crurt ar. suming and exercising executive
powers. They would practically control the appointment and re-
moval of members of the fire department in cities of this state
by the exercise cf Judgment and discretion as to fitness and
(22) 27>C> Til, AQr.
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and q.ua.Lif ications of inciiviciuals for positions in such depart-
ments, and not by acjudicating rights and applying the rule of
law." j]l89\v/)ere i-" t" ; decision it was said that there
cou±(j be no appeal in a legal sense unless there had been a de-
cision by a judiciao. tribunal
,
and this was the real basis of the
holding. "'his, of course, coer not ^--ro'iibit ta^ covrti
from entertaining such cases upon writs of certiorari bi; t in that
case its jurisdiction is not on an appeal but is under a different
form of procedure, by virtue of its .^enerai powers. Under
this decision, then, if it is to be given a general application,
the courts do not possess jurisdiction to review the findings of
facts of an adninistrative body, and front all the cases examined
that rule has been observed.
This decision, however, is hardly in keeping with the
somev;hat analogous cpse of Unitod Ctates v. Du.ell^^'^) , where a
statute was declared constitutional which allowed an appeal from
a decision of the Oomnissioner of tlie Patent Office to the Court
of Appeals of the District of Jolumbia, If both are to be
regarded as correct headings, it would be upon the ground tliat in
the case just cited actual property rights were involved, while
in the Ixlinois c
r
k o , no such important olemont was present.
At least from, a standpoint of securing governmental ef ffictiveness
in the removal of officers, the observance of the decision oin
tlie Illinois cjit''^, r,ince it is main Ly local in nature and does not
involve property rights, wixl bettor conserve t.ie rights of all
concerned than would be probable under a different construction.
(-.3) 17- r. 576.

Removal by Joui'tE,
There are two ways in v;hich the courts, may exer-^iso the
power of removal. The majority of decifjiors on t.ie ciLiestion
of rtii'iova^ ..oem to bleats tiiat this power Coeh rot iniierently
beioHig to either of the three dopartrnents of government.
Tiiis soi'ves to indicate the nature of the first method; that courts
may remove officers, v.iien, ' f p-:- nroviEic" •- r law, jurisdiction
of such causes has been given. The case of The People v.
\^eltyi'^'^) will prove sufficient to illustrate. Here a statute
gave authority to the circuit court to appoi" ' .-^t- -'-^ — i chan-
cery and to remove for good cause shown. The court rem.ovec the
relator v ithout observing any judicial process, but simply upon
tneir own ^incinr of fr.c'^s. action war '^'•r^tainec
higher court oii practically the same grounds as in the pi-eceding
cases. It was held to be_ an administrative act and, as the
statute provided for no notice c^r tri.. ' x3 coi-ri- w - f left to
its own discretion as U v. hat pj-ocecurts it Siioulc 1'Oj.j.ow.
Courts also reserve the ri^ht to oust from office one
illegally taking poj;session tliereof
, "^iiis procorure is not
strictly - r ^moval, for t;iat teria is app^iec: to t;iose having
legal possession of the office and the action ir to terminate the
official relation for causer which forfeit the office. Such
-.rill.: arioLis t;, out tuose co!;sioered under the
head of ej-ections, and in this chapter, are sufficient to indicate
the nature of the power.
Although from thu jut.o;. inrfc, it v. ouxo. seem that the
(^4) 75 111 App r.
,^
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powGr of removal may as v;ej.i be exercised by itiier of tlie c.epart-
ments of government, some courts hold that it is more properly a
jimiciax fi.ino t ion
.
But gr-^nting f!iat it if: jncM.'^fiai, the
i^ourts possess no power to exercise it in t.ie absence of ei^press
oelegation. There has been no case in Illinois v.herein the
cov;rts have attoiyptec to remove an cf 'icer simply upon conviction
.
. V. ^ '^^'tiie decision of a lower
court that conviction of crime constituted a forfeiture of office,
v;as reverserl, o^i the ground tliat no body had been given juris-
diction to uecxare w.iat malfeasance should work a removal.
That a lav, allowing the courts such jurisdiction vould be valid
appear?, from the dictum of the court tiio, t"It might be that the
provision wcua.c oe just and e.-^pedient v.^xich snouxd aecxare tiiat
the conviction of any official delinquency should ipso facto work
a forfeiture of the office wliich iiad been so abused,. In Cal-
ifornia such a statute as the one referred to, whicii aa-lowec re-
moval upon conviction of crime, was given effect ^ in Frazier v.
Alexander! '^^^ •
A^tacu^ii th.e act of removing from office partakes
the nature of a judicial or quasi -judicial nature, it appears from
the cases cited tliat there is notliirr inherer-t in the courts to
e.-.erciEe such pcwor , The sar.ie ii l:
.
'.aiu. as to alx other
bodies, in that the validity of its exercise must depend upon
express statutory or constitutional grant. The cases in which
the pov.or of removal is considered as an incidcjit to the power of
appointment are not examples of inherent power, for the reason
that the legislature is not proiiibited from subsequently vesting
(25) 3G i:ew J e r s
e
y Law 101. {'^6) 75 Jal. 147.
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the power of rernovax with other aiithori ties . If it appeared;
that th3 power c'id, in its nature, belong to one of the three de-
partments of government, in snch an event, that department might
possess an inherent rig'it to oxeroit-^e it. But in view of t]ie
''
diversity of opinion, in some cases it being regarded as judiciai,
in others executive, administrative or ptireiy ministerial; the de-
cision as to where t:ie power of removal sho-uld reside is based
sim.ply upon considerations of expediency. In making such
provision, attention must be given to the riglits of the people
to have everythin^^ of a public nature administered by proper au-
thorities and in a manner conducive to the public welfare.
On tlie otiier hand, it should not be made possible t'nat such power
could be too easily exercised, thus allowing it to.bec^--^- r, tool
of the removing body to control official acts. A certain
amount of freedom from such is essential to the exercise of of-
ficial powers •-'^r duties i^ -^^ d iscre tionar-^ r.,o^^^->^ 2nr.se-
quently in making provision for the rerqovax of public officers
there are relative advantages and disadvantages to be considered.
In thxis connection, it ini^rit be w.:, ' o note th3t of
the offices created by the Jonstitution--except those to whom the
impeacliment clause applies --provision for removal has been made
only for the ccunty treasurer, ^v^pbers of the' County Board of Cook
Oounty, and the sheriff in the one case already commented upon.
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Abrogation of Office by the l.egif.lature
.
There rvq also special methods by which t'le official re-
lation may be terminateo, but v;hich cannot strict, j-y b:; ter;;iec re-
movals from office. As already pointed out, the legislat-ure
may exercise complete control over offices which it creates.
It may therefore abolish any t..tatiitory office, and thus, in effect,
work a removal from office. If constitutional provisions ex-
ist, the power must be exercised within th.e limitations fixed there-}
in. For example, the Constitution 3.M^o',\t tnc; i.e_^ib^ature to
redistrict the state to form, new judicial circuits, but it was
held in The People v. Du Bois(27)that in so doing the legislature
could not deprive a judge of the territory Wid Jix constltutet. /us
district. In all other cases, the power is absolute; no right
of tiie incumbent of the statutory office being violated by its
abolition
.
Incompatibility of Offices.
The Constitution provides that "Ko person holding any
office of honor or profit under any foreign government or the
government of the United Ctates--oxcept post-masters, \v/iuse annual
compensation doss not exceed three hundred dollars--shall hold any
office of honor or profit under tlie authority of this state. .-.(29)
Under tiiis provision, the court held, in Dickson v. The People (28)
that the office of Director of tlie Illinois Institution for the
Deaf and Dumb wassuch an office, and therefore incompatible with
the office T'nited tates llarshall.
uestions of a similar nature also arise in tiie state
(27) £5 111. 498. 17 ^^^^ j,r,^/ (--Q^Art. TV. Toe. 5,
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I
goveniner-t wliere there ir^ no statutory or constitutional provision
|
regiilating tlie holding of more than one office. As a general
rule, v.'lien tlie functions of ono office ar^"' i"'"or r. i s ten t with those
of another, tlie two are helo to be incompatible at co/nmon ia;v
.
In zuch a case it is not ttie holding of tiie two offices wliich is
objectionable, br.t the incompatibility arises where there is a
conflict of interests. In this state, when such a conflict
is evident, the courts have held that the acceptance of tlie incom-
patible office is a resignation of the first.^"^^^ Also in
The Feopxe v. Ilan ifan^ "^-^^
,
where an alderman of the city was e-
lected to andaccepted a similar office under the city when re
-
organii^ed, tJie court lie id t:ie election ^'oid , arc ...1. acceptcnco of
the new office to be a i-esignaticn of tiie fonner.
Some of the decisions in other states may serve to show
that there is no definite principle, whicli can he apnlied in all
cases, in determining wliether tlie functions of one cilice are in-
compatible v.ith those of another. In Com. v. Ki rby ^ '^'^^ the
offices cf Jnstice of t'la pea^e s.r.C constable were lield to be com-
patib-^e, notwi thstand in^- that tiiis axlowed the officer to issue
and serve his own warrants.
,
/llso the offices of county super-
visor and circuit cleric(33)^ deputy sh-eriff and school di rector^"^ ^
'
secretary of state and adjutant general^ '^^^
,
and county clerk and
circuit clerk^ "^^Kvero all held to be compatible offices.
On the otiier hare, as to tliose which have been declared
to be inconipatibj.e
, not a great deal rf dissimilarity from tlie
(30) Packingham v. Harper, 66 111. App.96. (31) 96 111. 421.
•;-(32)2 Jusli. (Llass.) 577. (33) State v. Ferbleman, 28 Ark. 424.
(34) State v. Bus, 135 L;o.325. (35) State v. Weston, 4 r;eb.234.
(36) State v. Lusk , 40 Mo. 242.

proGodin^ cacef. car ^oti^^iu:
.
The office of pi-i.contiai con^-
mitte;-man and auditor of a £ciiool Cistrloti'^'^^ o^ttorney general and
prosecutor of p±eas(28)^ justice of the peace and ^^oroner^ )
,
and- sheriff and Jul of the peace ( '^'^) were i\x± i1'j±o to be incom-
patible. In the last case the court held that the functions
were inconsistent on the ground that the office of justice of t;ne
peace beJonged to the judicia^ c ..partrnent and tha^ ' f sheriff to
the execjutive.
Resignation from Office.
The holder of an office may also terminate liis official
relation by resigning. A resignation may take place either im-
pliedly, as was shown in The People v. Kanifan, by the acceptance
of an office incompatible V'ith the first; second, by the abandon-
ment of official duty, and third, by tenderin-^ formal resignation
when accepted by the proper authorities. Under the first,
the failuro of a duly elected alderman to attend the meetings of
tiie city council for five months Jv^./:;:idered an implied resig-
in
nation. Under t:ie second_^-/renn ison v. Cpencer( 41) the court
iield that the failure of a board to hold its m.eetings constituted
a resignation of its members. '
V.'hen a resignation takes place upon som.e positive act
which expresses the clear intent of the officer to give up his
office, two steps are necessary before such resignation becomes
effective. It must be tendered, usually in writing, and
(37) Cotton V. Phillips, 56 M. 11. 220. (38) State v .Thompson , 20 IJ.J.Ssi
(39)Bamford v. L'elvin, 7 Lie. 14. (40)Ctate Bank v. 3urran,lC Ark 14;S
(41) 101 111. App. 61. ' '

- 53 -
accepted by the proper officers. IVhen once acceptecl, it can-
not be recallled
.
In l^ace v. The Feople^'^^), t he county super-
intendent, having become a candidate for the office of circuit
clerl- , tendered liis resignation to the county court, by whom it
a statement to v/ithdraw his resignation, but the court held that
since a virtual acceptance had occurred, it could not be revoked.
Although a resignation has been accepted, in some cases,
the officer may be held responsible for carrying on th.e duties of
the office until his successor has been chosen and qualified.
In The People v. Cuperviscr ('^-S)^ where the township supervisor
had resigned and his resignation had been accepted, but his suc-
.
. i
cesser had not yet qualified, the court held that in form the ac-
ceptance of the resignation did end his term of office, but before
it could become effectual, it must be foxlov^ed by the qualification
of his successor.
was accepted
, Before his successor was appointed, he filed
(42) 50 111. 432. (43) 50 I 11 , 432
.

- 54 -
,.v r T .il R VII.
m FACTO OfTICSRS.
Cc far oonr iceration has been giver to the rules, which
govern officers ce jure. It is t.ie purpoLe of the rresent
chapter to examine the caset: which set forth the rights and powers
of offii^ers who do not possesE a legal title to office, or officers
de facto. An officer Ce facto, according to the accepted
definition, is "one who has the reputation of being tho officer
he assLimes to be, and yet is not a good officer it point of law."
This definition, in substance, is .quoted in numerous Illinois de-
cisions, ano is recognised as the basis of the de facto doctrine
in this state.
In the followin,;, cases, the question the validit,;-
--^
title to office has usually been raised in collateral proceedings.
Gome act of tlie supposed officer is drawn in question and, before
the courts will ree,arc such act as xe^axxy binding, the one hav-
ing assumed authority, must be "either an officer de jure or an
officer de facto. In such cases it is not necessary that
tlie courts pass upon the question of th:^ legality of title; it is
sufficient for tlie case before them that he is an officer do
facto. But, the act con-piaincd of may have been performed
by a mere intruder, in which case lu; v-^idity whatever attaches.
Ir deciding bet^^een these two, the court will determine wliether
some color of title is present. That is, the rights of
officers ce facto are depenuent upon the existence of some au-
thority to act.

Although tlie rule a?: statec ic prnc ticsllj'- invariable,
tl".ie question as to what facts are nece^i.^^iv to f^ivG oolor of title,
may be the subject of various interpretations, I^or have the
Illinois crnrts attempted to lay down any definite rule which they
mi^ht regard as determining in every state of facts; eaca case, as
it arises, being decided on its ovm merits. In the People v.
Beach^^'', they have held that one appointed to fill a vacancy in
the offic-3 of laaster in chancery, in holding over beyond thie time
for which he was cliosen, was an officer de facto for that period,
but x^ossessed no rights as against the de jure officer. Color
of titxe .lore v-as based on tiie fact that he uao actual possession
of the office, and because of the- dispute as to the length of the
term for which he was appointed whether for the unexpired term
or for t.ie entire two years. Tlie first is not always suf-
ficient, but the latter, which furnishes reasonable grounds for
believing him to be the legal officer, is determining.
The question of the le^axity of title i^ axso raised in
cases where there has been some- irregularity in qualifying for
office. 'though they may be sufficient to deprive an officer
of lii de jure title, so far as his acts are concerned, taey aro
valid as the acts of an officer de facto. In G-uy v, An-
drews^^^^" collector of taxes who had failed to take tlie newly pre-
scribed oatti of office, was regarded as an officer de f.v^.Gto.
In a similar case^'^), where an assessor iiad not taken the proper
oath of office before the rroj^Qv official, the court held that sucli.
(1) 77 Ii.1. 52. (5) C:ullivan v. The State
of Illinois, 66 111. 75
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was not a vai.id objectior. to the grantin-^ of a judgment against
^
certain ianos. for non-payment of taxes. Objections, such as
those, are usually considered of minor importance, when the valid-
ity of an act alreac'y performed is questioned. Irregularities
in cailin-, or holdif e, elections are also held to be not sufficient
to take away axl title to office. In such a case^"^^, the court
has held that those ceclared elected at an electicn which was in-
valid by reason of bome informality in calling it became officer.^ i
Ce facto, at least, when there were no ot-iers claiming legal title.
In these and similar cases, the Illinois courts haVe shown the
sa;:!0 teru'ency as tue courts of otliirr states to recognize as of ficeri:^
de facto those who are found in actual possession of an office,
ano are exercising its functions under som.e semblance of authority.
A more difficult question is resented when an rf-'Mcer
ovves his ejection or appointment to an unconstitutional law.
The casesln Illinois in which this question was involved should be
consic^rec from tv.o standpoints; first., as to those in which an
officer has been chosen under an unconstitutional law to an office
legally existing; second, those chosen to an office created by an
un c on s t i ti; t i o n a x law
,
The generally accepted i-^jle as to the former was fol-
lowed in The People v. Bangs^'^). Here the act of tlie legis-
lature, in redistricting t.ie state into new judicial circuits,
was held unconstitutional for tiie reason that it deprived a judge
of the territory over w/iich he riad been duly elected to preside,
and therefore removed .ii,:i from .lis office. The actual incumb-
ent who held under authority of the act, was regard ed by the court
^ C"c]iool Directors v.
( ^ IT ' n t ! C c h s ]i4-^^s^^:e^^y,8Q -JL.lj.-,^^S^-f= ^) ii;4 lii. 184 . =J
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as an officer de facto, ^is color of title depended, ut^ or,
his actual possesf.ion of the office and upon the f.-^ct that the
public, in regarding the act as consti t:-ti o-^r, was .jr:: t, I "isc
in believing him to be the officer v;h0;.i :ie pretended to g-j
.
'"he office lie re was a constitutional one, but in the
otiier class of cases, wliere an office h.as boon Greater hy an un-
constitutional statute, the court has expressed some doubt whetli-
er the incumbent of such an office should be regarded as an of-
ficer de facto. The first expression of tlie cour'!" on the
point is found in the Town of Lewiston v. iroctor^^'), wliore it was
said --although not a holdinc^ in the case- -that" it is true as con-
tended that 1 1 io re can be no ?uch thing as an office de facto
^
There riust be an office ue jure which the officerde facto might
fixl before :iis acts can be iie^-d valid." It was similarly
asserted in V.'arci v. Zori-i that w'.er.T t'-ere was r<^ office to
fil-L, there fould bo no officer eitiiar ce jure or de facto.
But the question was raised in a case where tlie supposed officer
was attempting to sue in his. own 'right; c on s ^ ir.or 1 1;/ the state-
ment quoted was only dicturi.
In Leacli v, '^he People^ "^^-j the payment of a tax was re-
sisted on the ground that the bonds, the interest on which was to
be paid by a tax, had been issued by an illegal body. The
court held the law which created the special board unconstiti^-
tiona±, but sustained the validity of the tax, on tlie ground that
inlQvyirg it tiiey had assuined powers whicii properly belon>;-,eu to a
similarly constituted body, which had a legal existence.
TeTTs 'iiiT'lsr.""'" {lyT^'TiZr-^?-- . r8)''T22TiT7~4iJoT
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Under the general, rule they were hcid to be officGrs Ce facto.
The case is further interesting on account of the dissenting opin-
ion. ]',r. Justice L'.agruder, and with whon -oi-cnrrer'' two other
justices, took the view tliat the board constituted an entirely nev;
office, having notliing to do with the larger body of the same name.
In the opinion of the dissent it was an office created by an un-
constitutional j.aw , and therefore, according to the rule laid down
in Korton v, Chelby County(9) , that there could be no such thing
as an office de facto, the levying of the tax cor. ic -:Ot be sus-
tained as the act of offi:;ers de facto. Inasrnucii as tlie
majority did net affirm that in either case the act would have
been sustained, but were very specific in holding it not to be a
new office, there is some ground for concluding had ' they so con-
sidered it, the a.evying of tlie tax would have been invalid as the
act of intruders.
The question received a further examination in The People
v, Knopf(J-O). The case arose on mandamus proceedings brought
by the township assessor to compel the county clerk to turn over
certain records whicii were then in the possession cf tlie board of
assessors, a body -created by the new tax law. The powers for-
merly belonging to the township assessor were tliereby transferred
to the new c rganir.a t ion . It was contended, that irrespective
of the validity of tlie law, the assessment made should be valid
the same ss if tlie board were officers de jure. To tins con-
tention the court took exception, and said: "This argument is
unsound in failing to distinguish between cases where there is an
(9) 118 U. S. 425. (10) 133 111. 410.
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existing office to be filled, and one where there is not. An
I
unconstitutional act cannot create an office'^ They argued
that the act did, in fact, create a new oflice, and, though affirm-
ing the decieion in loach v. The People, said: "But if the office
itself never existed there can be no office in fact." In
this connection the court, inadopting the v/ordf. of Dillon on Muni-
cipal Corporations, said , "But in order that there may be, within
the meaning of the above rule, a de facto officer, there must be
a de jure office; and the notion that there can be a de facto
office is without foundation in reason, and without sup-
port in ^av.." The validity of the act was affirmed, thereby
making the new board a legal office and those elected to it offi-
cers do jure. Had the act been held unconstitutional, the
sections quoteo would liave been c.irectly in point. Had they
then been followed, the act of making the assessment would not
have been legal. In that case, the incumbent of an office,
created by an unconstitutional .act , would not liave been regarded
as an officer de facto. As it was, the quotations given do
not represent tlie holding of tiie court.
From the considerations of these cases, it is clear
that t.iey do not present a square decision on the point. They
do serve to sliow t ie attitude which the court might take, should
a proper case be presented. The court has recognized,
that from a standpoint of public policy, such acts should be sus-
tained wherever possible, but the validity in every case has bean
determined upon grounds other taai; txiose oppressed in cases which
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hold t'lat there can be such a thing as an office de facto. The
distinction which is Eornetimes made between an act manifecrtiy un-
constitutional and one doubtfully l>o has never been attempteo by
the Illinois courts » noj? has the question been considered in any
of the cases cited. The rules as to who are officers de facto
may be well summed up in Ohief Justice Butler's def inition^'^hich
was quoted in lea^h v. The People. "An officer de facto is one
whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon
principles of policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they
involve the interests of the public and third persons, v.'.iere the
duties of tiiG office were exercised,
First, without a known appointnsn t or election, but under
such circumstances of reputation or acquiescence as were calculated,
to induce people without inquiry, to .submit to or invoke his action,
supposing him to be the officer lie assumeo to be.
Second, under color of a known and valid appointment or
election, but where the officer had failed to conform to some pre-
cedent, requirement or condition, a.s to take an oath, give bond or
the like
.
Third, under •jolor of a known election or appointment,
void because the officer was not eligible, or becui'se ther(3 v*at. a
want of power in the appointing or electing body, or by I'^eason of
some defect or irregularity in its exorcise, such ineligibility,
want of power, or defect being unknown to tiie pubi.ic.
Fourth, under color xf an election or appointment by or
pursuant to a public unconstitutional law, before the same is ad-
juoged to be such.''
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If the act complained of cynr.ct be brought within any of
the&e provitions, it v.ill be regarded by f.ie coi^rts as illegal
and void. In Lippencott v, Tov.'n of Pana^"^'"^. where it appearsd
that an issue of bonds, the proceeds of v/hich v;ere to bo donated
to a certain railway company, had been riin.de at a spe.:?ial town meet-
ing, in contravention of the statute \..i±2ii p'^ovid.ea tiiat such a
issues could, only be authorized at a regular town election, the
court held the wliole proceedings of the town meeting null and void.
In affirming tliat the act could not be sustainiu, as t'.io act of
officers de facto, the court rem.arl<:ed: "Had a majority of the board
acted, or had one of the board, together with one or more other
persons, assuming to act as judges of theelection, or had persons,
all of whom were othersthan tliose designated by law, officiated
under coj-or of appointment, howe^'-er defective, c-d assumed to act
as judges a e.ifferent q.Taestic!! ..cn-. u.jor. ..wj bo;, t-io.
.
Then
sucii persons might iiave been officers de facto, but nere there was
no such assumption nor were they even persons who as intrud-
ers or otherwise, assumed to officiate as an e-.ectior board or to
be de facto the officer designated by law." The court thin
holding the donation unauth.orizad by' lav^:, cone luded : " T t is essentiaJ
to the exercise of the power conferred, tliat t.ure i.,.ic\:±<j. 00 an
election at least purporting to be held as a general election.
The township has no authority to substitute a town meeting for an
election."
From this it appears that in order to possess colot of
title, one must act in the capacity of, and as though ho was, the
^ .
, ,
'
(1^) 92 Tl I , r^, J
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ie^al officer. It is not sufficient tliat an act be pGrfrrmed
by ore otiier than t'ns rightful officer; such an one mT;Et be in
actual possessiofi o"^ the office under £on^ -^t; t '"lority ^ ,^al or
illegal, but to such an extent that the pubxic VjouIO be juf-tifi:d
in regarding him as the one entitled to act, otherwise his acts
v/ould be those of i^triKler.
An examination of a few additional cases will indicate
more approximately, what i^. su-fficient to give color of title,
under vhicVi ac^ts rf officers de facto are held valid as regards the
rights of t:ie public and third parties; and also to affirm tlie
doctrine that tne title to an office cannot be inquired into in
collateral -proceedings.
In Trumbo v. The People ( -i-^'-' ) , a proceeding to obtain a
judgment against reaj. estate for non-payment of a district school
tax, the tax v.as resisted c-^ t':"; yr^ov^d ^ imply that the district
had been illegally formed. Tiie c.oi;rt admitted this for the
district iiad been formed by lines nearer than one mile to anotlier
EChool-Iiouso , v/hicli was prohibited by statute. Kevertheiess
the court held that it v.as a sciiooi district de facto; that the
directors thereof were directors de -facto; and that neitlier the
legality of tjie f;^— :^tio^: ro"' tae directors' title tc office could
be in-viuired into intnis, a cciiateral proceeding.
The rights of officers de facto apply equally as well
to tiiose who act in a public or q^;af\ i -public capacity. In
Golder V. Bressler^ ^'^^
,
wh.ere two parties, each claiming title to
certain land, one in fee simple, the other by conveyance through
a state bank
.
the qu efctio]^ » - l raised as to the legelit v of the
(15) 75 Ilx. 562. (14) 105 111. 419.
_
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appoirtnent of t:ift trustees to determine whether they had had
power to act in the piatter. Although arpoi-^-': t,:v- oc^'-rr-
or, they were net strictly state officers, the uecision v^ab taat
for thib case they were to be so considered, so far as the riglits
of third parties were affected, and that in .lateral proceed-
ing it was sufficient to show that tney were officers de facto.
Again, in Camuels v. Drainage Commissioners^ -^^ ' , the
court, in arguing against t... ---v-ntlcn that a certain a-cessment
was invalid because the persons xevying it liad not-authori ty , said:
Whether the clause providing for the election of commissioners
is valid r^r not is a question whi.-h does not need to be discussed".
The legislature iias created by statute such an office
and the petitioners, iiavin^ assumed the duties of such office,
are ae facto officers, and their official act,^ v,ill be held valid
until their right to exercise tiie duties of such office is called
in question by quo warranto." Perhaps a stronger case is pre-
sentee in Cnarp v. 'I'hompson^ , wiiere the act of a deputy clerk
of the circuit court in acknowledging the conveyance of a nome-
stead by mortgage was hold valid, although he had only been appoint
ed verbally, and never taken t.xe . at.i oT office nor executed a
bond as provided for by law.
This commonly accepted doctrine first spoken by the
Illinois court in fritchett v. The People ( -i- '7) has been reaf^ir-med
in a long line of cases. (13) It is we^i settled taat
' :
(^5)125 111. 526. (16)100 111. 447. (i7) 1 Gilm. 525.
(18) Cchofiexd V. V^atkins, 22 111. 6G; Supervisors of the
County
V. Jenks, 65 111. 275; Mapes v. "ne People, 69 111. 5.3;
Barlow v,
-etaiiafofdr,—B^-ni. 208; Co huj i iu
P
hei'n v. IvI±1raho-l±^16 I ll-.AppT^^.~
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courts v;ii.i rot, ina collateral proceeding look into t'ne title of
office; it is sufficient that he is an officer ce fricto, acting
under some color of title. Also, where an officer is required
to perform an act with respect to another officer, suca as turning
over asses sniert sheets, tlio act of the fo n^^r ir r
-;cognisin- t ie
latter, altiiou£,ii not a legai officer, is valia; nor can he be com-
pelled to regain possession of such books anci to turn them over to
the rightful of^icer/"^^^
These rules apply only to those who are ^n actual pos-
session of the office. If there are tv.o or more, each claim-
ing title, the acts of the one who has r'-'-^li ;->osr hr.ir.r^ ar3 lid
.
In C.choox Directors v. Tingley ^ '^^^
,
vviiere tue act of ivvo school
directors, the successful contestants of an election, in anpoint-
ing a teac:i'vr ""or a certain school, . :
, althougii those
originally ueoj.ared elected, made a similar appointment at the
same time. "^he case of the contested election, upon being
heard in the Cuprepio >ci-rt, was ro-'orsed and decided ir ^'r-'ror of
the latter board. At the timo tliey made their appointment
they were the de jure board, in, fact, but in this case, a suit for
salary by the teacher ;^^^o ir tf d by r--+r hoard, cr^c i^otlvg
under this appoin tmen t , v.as ax±ov»ed. Txie same effect was given
to the acts of a de facto board in School Directors v. i'ational
School Fu i-nir.hir 'o.^^^^, wliere it was said: "V.iiere t'.iore is but
one office, tnere cannot be an officer de jure and an officer de
facto, both in possession of tlie office at the same time.
Where one, rightfully entitled to the office, i^ discharging its
{19)reople V. Lieb, 85 I1.l. 484. (^$)}75 Ixi. I\pp.471.
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functions and. actuaxiy in posLefcsicn , tlie actf: of anot.ier, obtrud-
in^ hir.i£ej.f into the office, are void.
Tliis r3viev/ of t'^'"? cases sii r "'^i -ic s the r.tatiis of c;e
facto officers in their re^-ation to the r-ublic and to tliird parties.
It is seen- that in just so far there is iitt-i.e if any distinction
between officers de facto and de jure. But wlion such officers
attempt tc act in their own behalf, different ruj.es apply. It
is a generally accepted coctrine that officers de facto cannot sue
in their own right . In the 3 - .;v ; ! I^^inois v.-'.ior-? this
question has been involved, the court aas invariably reilised to
fcustain the action sought by the officer de facto. In People
v. V;eber(^^), a mandamus was ..y , ->ii^2. ^2 city
treasurer, to compel th^e county treasurer to turn over certain city
taxes v;hicli were in his possession, but the writ was not granted
on the ground that bein^. '^^^ '-^ricor l. - :' , --'-rl-' cl^lr-
nothing for himself. In a &imij.ar case^'--'^, arising in tae same
city and involving practically the saine facts, a mandamus was re
-
fu s e d , ^. - ;J court ho Id in g tha t , " Vv he re a part/ f. i :: ' r Ci e f e n c £ i^i
his ov.n right as a public officer, it is not sufficient that p.e
be merely an -of ficer de facto; he m.ust be an officer 6e jure; an
officer Oq facto <^''r^ ^l.-^i-^ r^-t/iii- for himself." In Ctott v.
City of Jhicagof'Svhere a police patrolman, having been dropped from
the pay-roll, attempted by mandamus to compel payment of his sal-
ary, t.i'o court held to the same do -ft ri that in order to, ' n.^. ^ t:'J
such an action, he must be an officer ue jure. Txie fact that
(22) 86 111. 285. {j3)People v. V.eber, 39 111. 547.
(24^ 2C5 111. 23i..
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after he had been dropped from the pay-roil he actuaxly served for
a short time in performing his regular duties did not entitle him
to any salary; TliG court tluis holding that the rig]it to
j
salary depends not on services renosrec but upon the ^e^ality of
title to office.
It is v/exl settled, that when the salary pertaining to
an office has actually been . " ; to the officer de facto, no action:
will lie by the officer de jure for such salary against the au-
tho-Ht" which radG -t , but an action drss lie against the
person receiving, it. Tiie o-atter was the nci.o.ing in laayi'lao-u v.
Moore. (^5) The case is noteworthy in containing a variation
of the ru.le v.iiich perliaps is not of general application in that
the de facto officer was allowed to retain a portion of th.e sa.Lary
to an amount sufficient to reimburse him for actual expenses in- \
currec v'm:.1.-> i "f'^lce. Althr\ ..Icing this, the court \
left it to h-j iiu'eri-ed that had ne intruded into ! ' " „'' .-
|
cut pretense of legal right, a "differen t rule would have been ap-
plied
.
As a general rule, then, the courts wij.1 give effect to
th.e acts of officers oe facto when they affect the rights of third
parties, but vviil not ("o wh.en th.e act is strictly in their own
beliaif . The rules as to ^.ucii officers are uase^^ .i.arj^e^y upon
considerations of public policy, in deeming It wiser to protect
the public i^- ^^11 c?ses, oven t'lou -h at t]\e expense of the de jure
officer.
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